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Abstract
The European Community as a social configuration, with its complex division
of competencies and action capacities between EC institutions and national
governments, is still difficult to conceptualize. In this context the authors pro-
pose the concept of corporate actor networks in order to understand more
thoroughly the interaction processes of policy integration by which the Euro-
pean community has accumulated increasing supranational action capacities.
A case study on the emergence and development EC telecommunications policy
provides the background for a discussion of the scope, structure and operation
of such EC policy actor networks.
* * * * *
Mit ihrer komplexen Verteilung von Kompetenzen und Handlungskapazitäten
zwischen den EG-Institutionen und den Mitgliedsstaaten ist das Sozialgebilde
Europäische Gemeinschaft immer noch schwierig zu konzeptualisieren. Hierzu
schlagen die Autoren das Konzept des Netzwerks korporativer Akteure vor.
Dieses soll die Interaktionsprozesse zwischen den relevanten Akteuren in den
Europäischen Gemeinschaften, welche der Integration verschiedener Politiken
(policies) dienen, genauer fassen. Mittels einer Fallstudie über die Herausbil-
dung und Entwicklung der EG-Telekommunikationspolitik wird ein Einblick
in die Reichweite, Struktur und Operationsweise dieser transnationalen Poli-
tiknetzwerke auf EG-Ebene gegeben.
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1 Introduction
Telecommunications policy is an exemplary field for the transformation of the
European Community (EC) from a state-centric bargaining system to a trans-
national multi-level policy network. The creation of this network was mainly
driven by European institutions as corporate actors. In a short time this led to
the convergence of quite different national administrative systems and industry
structures. The integration process resulted in a transnational policy harmoniza-
tion in which the Commission was one of the key actors. This network type
of political integration, however, has its price. The definition and, more so, the
implementation of a European policy requires time-consuming and often bur-
densome negotiations with a mushrooming set of policy actors from different
political arenas, including those within the member states. Government agen-
cies, large firms, business associations and trade unions with a national or a
European constituency number among the actors. Whilst problematic from a
perspective of democratic control, policy making in a transnational policy net-
work appears to be an effective response to increasing interdependencies and
coordination problems.
The following sections of the paper describe the emergence of this policy net-
work in the telecommunications sector and the dynamics unfolding in this
institutional transformation process. Before we analyze the historical integration
process of European telecommunications policy, we will shortly outline the
conceptual framework by which our interpretations are guided.
2 The European Community as an Emerging Political System
From an institutional perspective the European Community (EC) is a creature
that is difficult to define. None of the current approaches is completely mislead-
ing, but each draws a different picture emphasizing unique components in the
overall portrait. The EC has been conceptualized as a federation in the making
(Hallstein et al. 1969), a supranational organization (Haas 1964), an intergovern-
mental bargaining system (Scharpf 1988), an international regime (Hoffmann
1982) and a concordance system (Puchala 1972).
Each of the concepts provides a unique combination of organizational facets.
However, all fit into a rank order with respect to stronger or weaker autonomous
action capacities. The federation approach – attributing the largest amount of
power resources to the EC – is clearly located at the upper end of this scale.
Here, the EC is seen as a supranational authority incorporating significant
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control capacities and sovereignty over its member states. Pure intergovernmen-
tal approaches, in contrast, rank on the lower end of the scale. They treat the
EC as a pure bargaining system with no genuine authority at the interstate
level. The regime approach and the concordance concept, finally, locate the
major integrative forces on the intergovernmental level. However, they add
important cognitive (common knowledge) and normative elements (norms,
rules, procedures) facilitating cooperation. They also address the supposed
paradox of a relatively powerful and integrated complex of European institu-
tions on the one hand and an intergovernmental decision structure where the
member states still have the final say on the other (Hoffmann 1982).
Two crucial shortcomings of the different approaches can be recapitulated. First,
even when European institutions are explicitly included in the analysis they
tend to be conceived as a passive social environment (norms, rules, frameworks)
rather than active components with autonomous action capacities. Second,
European policy making is primarily analyzed in terms of state-centric inter-
action with (few) governments aggregating and representing national political
and economic interests, thus widely neglecting the existence of both genuine
European interests, which have to be enforced in national political arenas, and
the multitude and plurality of national and European actors to be coordinated
and concerted in European policy making.
Corporate Actor Characteristics of European Institutions
After years of neglecting European institutions, scholars are beginning to redis-
cover them as powerful actors rather than as mere rule systems.1 The European
Community is clearly an internally differentiated "corporate actor" with autono-
mous action capacities beyond the member states (Kenis/ Schneider 1987;
Schneider/ Werle 1990). Corporate actors are solutions to problems of coopera-
tion and coordination in collective action. They are created when the joint pro-
duction or provision of public or club goods tends to be unstable or a mere
horizontal coordination of parallel activities is too costly. In order to put the
capacity for joint action on more stable grounds, the interested parties invest
and pool resources into a separate body which then is entrusted to act (for a
specific set of goals) on behalf of its members and their interests (Coleman 1974,
1990). Once created, however, corporate actors do not remain mere agents –
1 See also Bieber et al. 1988; Andersen/ Eliassen 1991; Sandholtz/ Zysman (1989).
The latter stress the Commission’s ability "to exercise effective policy leadership"
and its role as "policy entrepreneur" (Sandholtz/ Zysman 1989: 96).
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they develop self-interests and gain autonomy. At the least they strive for the
preservation of their existence; often they also try to expand their activity do-
mains and competencies. This can be observed in a number of organized action
areas (Flam 1990; Streeck 1983).
Similar dynamics unfold within the Community framework: The EC institutions
(especially the Commission, the Court of Justice, the European Parliament) are
not merely passive institutional frameworks for intergovernmental policy coor-
dination. The European Commission in particular is more than an agency pas-
sively registering and executing orders of its member states via the Council.2
It plays an active role in the identification and formulation of common interests.
In the Commission’s administrative apparatus, individual aspirations to pro-
mote a career in the "Eurobureaucracy" are directly supported by activities
aiming at a strengthening of the Community as a whole. Therefore, more than
the other two genuine European institutions, the Parliament and the Court of
Justice, the Commission has shown its ability to act as an autonomous actor
with a tendency to enlarge its area of competence, to mobilize new resources
(including legitimacy) and to enter new policy fields. On occasion, the Commis-
sion has even got involved in open legal or political conflicts with one or sev-
eral member states.
This capacity can be exemplified in several ways. The famous achievement of
the Single Market, which grew out of the revision of the Rome Treaty through
the Single European Act, is rightly acknowledged to the Commission’s credit.
However, this initiative grew out of a failed attempt of the European Parliament
to improve European integration. The almost forgotten Spinelli proposal was
rebuffed by the European Council, and this essentially triggered the Commis-
sion’s initiative. Another example of the Commission’s autonomy comes from
sectoral policy. Because the Rome Treaty does not encompass all issues relevant
to economic integration, the Commission was frequently able to put new issues
on the political agenda. During the 1960s and the 1970s these initiatives bore
little fruit. Since the beginning of the 1980s, however, the Commission has been
2 The Council of Ministers and, even more so, the European Council are typically
regarded as the "manifestation of institutionalized intergovernmentalism" in con-
trast to "supranational institutions like the Commission, the Court of Justice and
the Parliament" (Cameron 1992: 63). In our opinion, this tendency to dichotomize
the European reality is an unpromising effort to maintain familiar formal catego-
ries of analysis. Empirically only a few examples of European high politics such
as the ("Maastricht") Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union (Laursen
1992) suggest treating the Council as an aliud in the European ensemble. In gen-
eral, from a network perspective some of the old formal dichotomies appear to
be obsolete.
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increasingly successful at getting its initiatives adopted by the Council. The
Framework Programs for Research and Development (Peterson 1991; 1992;
Grande 1993: 61-67), the completion of the Single Market (Cameron 1992), and
the liberalization of the markets for telecommunications, air transportation and
banking, which until that time had been strongly controlled at the member-state
level and had not been addressed in the Treaty, are now part of the institutional
fabric of the European Community.3
The EC complex should therefore be seen as a corporate actor with its own
action resources and institutional self-interests geared toward greater integra-
tion. A corporate actor, however, is not necessarily a hierarchy (Geser 1990;
Scharpf 1991; Vanberg 1992). A corporate actor’s control structure may be high-
ly decentralized, displaying network-like features of organizational forms (Teub-
ner 1992). Although the EC member states have transferred a number of compe-
tencies to the Community level, they have not, as yet, set up a supranational
hierarchy in which the constituent units lose all autonomous decision-making
capacities. Indeed, most directives are issued by the Council under the unanim-
ity rule. There are few texts that a member state has to apply without having
approved them. For dissenting member states, exceptions are often explicitly
foreseen, albeit for a transitory period.
The division of power between the national and the European level is thus
fairly complex (see Schmitter 1992). EC law is formally superior to national law.
However, until now Community legislation is not automatically effective in
the different member states, but has to be adopted by national parliaments.
Such national implementation processes are not mere formal ratifications of
EC regulations or directives. National legislators (especially in the case of EC
directives) have some degree of discretion and, to some extent, have the final
say. Even when a member state is formally obliged by the European Court of
Justice to adopt a piece of legislation, national legislators have considerable
power to delay, hinder or even obstruct legislative harmonization (Scherer
1990)4.
The EC is thus in a position similar to national governments regarding difficul-
ties in policy implementation. Notwithstanding their formal power to execute
3 For overviews of European policy integration in these sectors, see Majone (1990)
and Andersen/ Eliassen (1993).
4 This does not mean that the remarkable integrative power of European judicial
review shall be underestimated (see e.g. Dehousse/ Weiler 1990; Weiler 1991;
Shapiro 1992). For a more detailed discussion of what we call the corporate actor
properties of the EC and its institutions see Peters (1992) and Schneider/ Werle
(1989).
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a policy, national governments may be unable to mobilize the necessary re-
sources to put legislation into force. In many policy domains these resources
are dispersed to such a degree that without the cooperation of relevant target
actors, a policy program would remain ineffective (Mayntz 1983). In order to
mobilize cooperation and support, national governments often incorporate the
relevant social and political interests into the process of policy formulation.
Potential conflicts in the implementation phase are thus prevented by means
of early bargaining and interest accommodation.
A Network Concept of European Policy Making
Because of the coexistence of EC and national legislation processes, however,
the problems of policy making and policy implementation at the Community
level are much more complex and multilayered than in a member state. The
success of an EC policy program depends not only on a harmonized adoption
by twelve national parliaments, but also on the effective implementation in
twelve different arenas. To achieve maximum synchronization of EC legislation
and its adoption by member states, European policy formulation is preceded
and accompanied by processes of consultation, information exchange, interest
accommodation and alliance formation. This leads to sociopolitical configura-
tions which are currently conceptualized as "policy networks" (Marin/ Mayntz
1991; Kenis/ Schneider 1991).
While most of the burgeoning policy network literature is predominantly fo-
cused on national policy making, some studies have begun to apply the "net-
work view" to the European and transnational level as well5. This can be seen
as a reaction to the concern that the classical model of hierarchical coordination
proved to be too restrictive when applied to national and, more so, to trans-
national policy making. However, some variants of the classical model are still
influential. In particular, the studies which emphasize the dominance of nation-
al governments in European political processes (Bulmer 1983; Moravcsik 1991;
also Sbragia 1992) apply what Nye/ Keohane (1973) termed the "state-centric"
model of policy coordination, which views states as unitary actors at the inter-
national level. Here, European policy making is modelled essentially as a "two-
level game" (Bulmer 1985; Putnam 1988): in the first stage, member-state gov-
ernments interact with domestic actors in lower level games; in the second, they
proceed to represent the aggregate interests in negotiation games within the
5 See, for example, various articles in Wallace (1990), especially Keohane/ Hoff-
mann (1990); see also Schumann (1991), Balme (1991).
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Council of ministers. While this model is flexible for iterative processes of mutu-
al adjustments between the connected games, lateral and diagonal interactions
between the players in the different games (such as nongovernmental national
groups, governments from other countries, supranational actors) are, by defini-
tion, excluded from the analysis. If all players’ interactions are to be taken into
account, a distinction between only two levels of a game would, at the very
least, seem rather artificial.
Therefore, while the two-level game approach may be suitable for the analysis
of traditional diplomacy, including a few cases of European high politics (Put-
nam 1988), it is largely inappropriate as a model for European policy making.
The connected games approach (Scharpf 1991) only appears plausible in situa-
tions in which games are effectively segregated and information on players and
payoffs within one game is (largely) unknown to players in the other games.
However, the European scene is different: the growth of increasingly dense
information and cooperation networks across national borders and the broker-
age role of interest groups and European institutions at the Community level
make this "incomplete information" argument less and less valid. The old star-
shaped structure of twelve domestically segmented games that are intercon-
nected by central governments at the EC level becomes increasingly inter-
meshed with a tendency toward an all-channel network. The connected games
are merging into an n-person European policy game. This does not mean that
in a given domain every nationally relevant actor also participates in European
policy making, or that every player is informed about the interests and strategies
of all other (national and European) players. We can assume, however, that
at least the key players on the different levels are informed about their mutual
interest positions and will take each other into account.
The interaction of policy actors in European policy processes is thus far more
complex than "two-level-bargaining" or "state-centric" models suggest. Formally,
there is a two-stage sequential process in which the member-state governments
first negotiate in the Council and then ratify the agreements separately in each
member state (Putnam 1988). However, around this formal structure there is
a complex array of informal relations between subnational actors in different
countries, on the one hand, and national actors and supranational players such
as the CEC or European Interest Groups on the other. These relationships enable
the actors within the EC policy system to obtain much more information about
one another than it is common in traditional diplomacy (Puchala 1972: 282).
Empirical studies of EC policy making structures do not support the state-cen-
tric model, either. The growth of Community lobbying in particular indicates,
as shown by Andersen/ Eliassen (1991), that the Commission and the Parlia-
ment are approached by a wide range of actors including individual firms,
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regional associations, cities, professional lobbyists and national as well as Euro-
pean interest associations.6 The participation of heterogeneous interests in
mushrooming committees also suggests network characteristics of EC policy
making. Between 1983 and 1988 the number of committees and expert groups
almost doubled to 1,400. Most are affiliated with the Commission or the General
Directorates (Grote 1990; Wessels 1990; Sidjanski 1989; Peters 1992).
The structure of Community lobbies and committees suggests that, on the EC
level, policy networks usually incorporate not only supranational and interna-
tional actors (as traditional state-centric models would suggest), but in most
cases the key actors from national policy arenas as well. EC policy networks
are thus hybrid mixtures of national, supranational, intergovernmental, trans-
governmental and transnational actors and interrelationships7.
The different types of actors can be classified as follows:
– at the national level there are corporate actors which are almost exclu-
sively oriented toward the national policy arena;
– at the supranational level there are corporate actors such as the various
EC institutions and the European interest organizations (EIO);
– at the intergovernmental level there are the different member states;
– at the transgovernmental level there are corporate actors from national
subgovernments;
– at the transnational level there are all kinds of societal actors continuously
engaged in transnational relations, such as national interest groups, scien-
tific institutes and other organizations.
In many cases, actors’ "membership" in the networks is based on formal coopta-
tion into advisory committees or expert groups, but in a number of domains
the incorporation also works on a very informal basis. But increasingly formal-
ized structures are evolving. In recent years the Commission has encouraged
the growth and differentiation of formally organized interest groups at the EC
level (EIOs) to represent their constituent interests collectively rather than indi-
vidually toward EC institutions (Greenwood et al. 1992). The Commission is thus
pursuing a policy of "recognizing" EIOs to which it gives preferential treatment during
EC policy-making processes.8 Despite their growing numbers (in 1985 there were
6 See also Kohler-Koch (1992); for more details, see Schneider (1992) for the field
of telecommunications and Peterson (1991) for the field of technology policy.
7 For these distinctions see Nye/ Keohane (1973) and Keohane/ Nye (1974).
8 An EIO is "recognized" if its name appears on the Commission’s list, if it is invit-
ed to advisory committees, or if it is consulted by appropriate divisions or ser-
vices within the commission (Sargent 1985: 236).
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654), these interest organizations, still weak in comparison to their national
constituencies, are far from being able to make binding decisions for their mem-
bers. Most member organizations command far greater resources than their
nominally superior peak units. Thus, corporatist arrangements which often
work at the level of national policy processes seem to be difficult to achieve
at the European level (Streeck/ Schmitter 1992). Large firms tend to have their
own direct representations in Brussels (for the automobile industry see Jordan/
McLaughlin 1991).
In Figure 1 the traditional state-centric network model of intergovernmental
policy concertation is contrasted with a pluralist transnational policy network
which, in our opinion, portrays European reality more adequately.
Gvmt A Gvmt B
Sub Gvmt
Parliament
Interest
Groups
Sub Gvmt
Parliament
Interest
Groups
European
Community
Gvmt A Gvmt B
Sub Gvmt
Parliament
Interest
Groups
Sub Gvmt
Parliament
Interest
Groups
European
Community
State-Centric Model Transnational Network Model
Figure 1: Two Models of Policy Concertation
The highly pluralist pattern exhibited by the EC policy networks is a conse-
quence not only of numerous actors’ efforts to influence the European political
process in an early stage of policy formulation, but also of a deliberate network-
ing strategy employed by the European Institutions, especially the Commission.
To ensure national adoption of EC policy programs and legislation, participa-
tion in program formulation cannot be restricted to actors on the EC level alone.
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The relevant national interest groups, government officials and administrative
experts have to be incorporated as well (Wessels 1990). In some cases the Com-
mission even forges alliances with national interest groups in order to exert
pressure on governments and legislators to channel policy development toward
Community goals. At the same time, the pluralist structure means that the poli-
cy networks cannot be completely controlled by EC actors, although the Com-
mission is certainly more than a primus inter pares. Other core actors in these
networks are multinational corporations, which often act as "reverse lobbies"
supporting the EC institutions by putting pressure on governments and busi-
ness associations in their host countries (van Tulder/ Junne 1988).
3 The European Community in Telecommunications Policy9
The following case study on EC policy making in telecommunications offers
insight into the structure, operation and development dynamics of an EC policy
network which was only recently "Europeified". The telecommunications policy
sector provides an interesting case of EC domain expansion driven – at the
time – by an historical coincidence of external pressure, unique opportunities
and active engagement on the part of the Commission. Complex alliances at
the national and European levels have led to a synchronization and harmoniza-
tion of policies which would have been unthinkable only 10 years ago.
The First Steps Toward European Telecommunications Policy
Although telecommunications has a long history of international cooperation,
significant EC policy activities did not evolve until the early 1980s. During the
preceding decades, the exclusive forum of cooperation was the European Con-
ference for Post and Telecommunication (CEPT). Created as an interadministra-
tive body by a diplomatic conference in 1959, the CEPT was an exclusive do-
main of the traditional Post, Telephone and Telegraph (PTT) administrations.
It dealt primarily with tariff principles and other relevant issues to be settled
among the PTTs (long-range planning, common position in international fora,
etc.). From the mid-1970s on, the CEPT also had the function to decide (on a
9 This sections covers the same topic as an earlier paper by two of the authors
(Schneider/ Werle 1990), but places greater emphasis on internal relationships
within the EC and the evolution of the actor network in this policy domain.
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consensual basis) on technical standards necessary for interconnecting telecom-
munications networks.10
The EC’s entry into this area and the creation of a European telecommunica-
tions policy domain – which, as a side effect, reduced the relevance of the CEPT
considerably – must be seen in an industrial policy context in the information
technology sector. Telecommunications was considered by the European Com-
mission to be part of the information technology industry, which encompassed
microelectronics, computers, consumer electronics, professional electronics and
telecommunications. The Commission was concerned because European firms
were losing ground in this area. Both the leadership of American firms in mi-
croelectronics and computers, and the Japanese’ bold attempt to use a highly
ambitious chip program (VLSI) to catch up with the American firms in micro-
electronics had very much impressed the Commissioner responsible for Indus-
trial Affairs, Davignon. The specific conditions in the European information
technology industry, however, constrained the EC’s possibilities to influence
further developments considerably at that time.
1. There was no European dimension whatsoever in the semiconductor,
computer and related industries, because of the French government’s
refusal in December 1974 to support the merger of Siemens, Philips and
CII (French computer manufacturer) interests in the computer industry
into a joint venture called Unidata. Unidata was to be a counterpart to
Airbus and Ariane – two successful European, government-supported
joint ventures – in the field of high technology, dominated at that time
by the USA. However, Unidata’s supporters were unable to achieve a
political consensus between the French, the Dutch and the German gov-
ernments. The failure of Unidata created much mistrust among the mem-
ber states concerning the possibility of cooperation in information technol-
ogy industries.11
10 It was not restricted to the EEC but included EFTA countries as well. Delegates
worked in subcommittees which met every six months, while a plenipotentiary
session was held every two years which defined the working plan of each sub-
committee (Labarrère 1985). The PTTs were pleased with the institutional ar-
rangement of the CEPT since it gave them great freedom and was established
as a "gentlemen’s club". Any difficult decision on which a consensus could not
be found had to be delayed to the next meeting.
11 The best account on Unidata can be found in Jublin/ Quatrepoint (1976), accord-
ing to whom Unidata failed because the Compagnie Générale d’ Electricité
(CGE), which was one of the two shareholders of CII with Thomson, successfully
lobbied Président Giscard d’ Estaing to turn down the initiative.
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2. The telecommunications sector, like other public utilities (such as electric-
ity), was exempted from the public procurement directive to governments
to open their tenders to European manufacturers. The purchase of equip-
ment still remained a national affair, and the PTTs continued to enjoy a
protected status as organizations which, according to the Rome Treaty,
could be declared vital to national interest.
Within this context, since the late 1970s the EC has successfully entered the
telecommunications field and, in doing so, has opened a further area of eco-
nomic and political integration. The first interventions in this sector occurred
in 1979 when communication policy was discovered as a relevant factor deter-
mining the industrial competitiveness of Europe vis à vis USA and Japan12.
This led to the launch of ESPRIT (European Strategic Program for Research in
Information Technology) and to the Commission’s proposal to promote the
Europe-wide introduction of new telematic services.
At least three stratagems in the Commission’s intervention can be distinguished:
First, an incremental approach was developed with the aim to harmonize and
standardize the introduction of new, mainly telematic, services and equipment
at the European level. The CEC thought that it would be easier to harmonize
new equipment markets. This approach failed because the French, the British
and the Germans were not willing to harmonize their telematic equipment (in
particular videotex). The only success in harmonization was achieved in the
definition of services with a long-term perspective. In 1982, the Groupe Spécial
Mobile (GSM) of the CEPT agreed to introduce a Pan-European cellular tele-
phone service within ten years (in 1992!), and to reserve a bandwidth for that
purpose. Also, the coordinated introduction of ISDN was foreseen. This means
that PTTs at that time were prepared to commit themselves to harmonizing
their services only in areas which would grow in the longer run. The incremen-
tal approach thus did not bring very spectacular results.
A second, federative approach was also taken. Its goal was to go beyond mere
standard setting and to mobilize resources for a Europe-wide telecommuni-
cation infrastructure. The first step was the creation of the Euronet/Diane net-
work in 1979 as well as the CADDIA and INSIS programs in 1982. Euronet was
an X.25 (packet-switched) data network designed to convey on-line information
between databases all across Europe. The purpose of this network, into which
the CEC poured 3.5 million dollars, was to permit interconnection of the na-
tional X.25 networks as they became available (Dang-Nguyen 1986: 276-277).
12 Basic points of the "definition of the situation" had been outlined by Nora and
Minc (1978) in a report to the French president.
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Also, the dissemination of information about Europe throughout the EC was
expected to contribute to the achievement of the European Market.
INSIS was to provide an office automation network between Luxembourg,
Strasbourg and Brussels which would interconnect all the offices of the Europe-
an institutions. Beyond the rationalization expected from the common use of
electronic office documents within the European institutions, a more subtle aim
was to stimulate the adoption of office automation products on telematic net-
works. CADDIA, finally, aimed at rationalizing the customs procedures between
member states via electronic networking in order to facilitate the free flow of
goods and services within the Community.
It is interesting to note that the policy networks involved in the two general
approaches were largely different. The harmonization of markets for telematic
equipment was tackled by DG III (Internal Market) and relied mainly on rela-
tionships with professional associations, manufacturers and the Departments
of Industry in each member state. It had the support of Commissioner Davignon,
who dreamt of the Commission as a European MITI, boosting the competitive-
ness of the European industry. The people involved in Euronet, CADDIA and
INSIS came from a different horizon. Their projects were supported within the
Commission by DG XIII. This department included a division called Informa-
tion Services, which was responsible for the diffusion and dissemination of
technical and scientific information in the EC. Their main partners were librar-
ies, information agencies, public laboratories (with a strong interest in keeping
in touch as efficiently as possible), and public administrations (customs, finance
ministers etc.). The policy network around the DG XIII was clearly less power-
ful than the one around DG III.
As the incremental and federative approaches were taking shape, a third ap-
proach was being used by EC institutions: the legal approach. A series of legal
actions in telecommunications had been undertaken in the past. In 1978 DG IV
(Competition), for example, reacted to a complaint by SWIFT13 with an inquiry
into the restrictions imposed by the PTTs upon the use of international leased
lines as well as into the PTTs’ prohibitive tariffs. After a compromise be-
tween the CEPT and SWIFT had been reached, however, the inquiry was
abandoned.14
13 SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Information and Fund Transfer) manages the
international data networks of banks.
14 The ability of SWIFT to reach its objectives in negotiations with the PTTs
says a great deal about the position of pressure groups in the European
context. First, SWIFT is based in Brussels and is quite familiar with the in-
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Other legal actions were taken during the late 1970s and early 1980s. In
1979 the European Court of Justice ordered the British Post Office to discon-
tinue its restrictive practice on the use of international telex circuits. On appeal
by the Italian government, the Court confirmed that PTT business was mainly
commercial activity and that, in this capacity, the PTTs were subject to the
conventions of the Rome Treaty. With this ruling, the Court established the
principle that telecommunications as public utilities were not immune from
Community action.
Unlike the incremental and the federative approaches, the legal approach was
not contingent on the mobilization of a large policy network. However, as the
SWIFT case shows, players strong and knowledgeable enough to lobby DG IV
could succeed in challenging the immense power of PTTs at that time. On the
whole, European institutions – especially the Commission – were very active
in trying to influence the development of telecommunications in Europe. How-
ever, the actions lacked coordination, there was no clear vision of what the
European telecommunications policy should be and the instruments of these
actions were limited in scope. Thus, the Commission’s initiatives were only
moderately effective.
Another inhibiting factor was the lack of vested interests in the promotion of
a Europe-wide telecommunications policy. The PTTs were satisfied with the
CEPT arrangement, and the equipment manufacturers were looking outside
the Community for their exports, particularly to the Third World. Only the
users, often multinational corporations, sometimes complained about the inflexi-
bility of PTTs, high tariffs, poor quality of services, and obstacles to strategic
planning because some PTTs revised their budget every year. However, the
users’ complaints were not yet voiced in an organized fashion. Most of the
traffic was still concentrated in telephony, which was considered part of (and
concealed in) the overhead costs of a company. IBM, just discovering telecom-
munications as a key area for diversification, was entangled in an antitrust case
with the European Commission and had to keep a low profile. Other service
providers such as Telenet, Tymnet and GEIS were investing very little in
Europe at that time.
tricacies of the EC bureaucracy. Second, SWIFT is an international consor-
tium of influential banks. Given these conditions, as early as 1977 SWIFT
was able to recognize the importance of legal instruments and to lobby DG
IV to get from the PTTs what the Commission is now trying to obtain (15
years later!) with the Leased Lines Open Network Provision (ONP) directive:
tariffs related to costs.
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To summarize the situation up to 1983, concertation in telecommunications
policy functioned similarly to the "state-centric" model depicted in Figure 1, with
governments and PTTs acting, very reluctantly, as the only interface with the
European institutions. Transnational policy networks, if they existed at all, were
still weak and rather unstable.
The Making of European Telecommunications Policy
In the early 1980s the situation in the telecommunications sector changed. A
conjunction of – sometimes only weakly correlated – events created the context
for a "quantum leap". Within a few years, the political weight of the EC in the
national telecommunications sectors had increased considerably. A key event
was certainly the deregulation and liberalization of telecommunications markets
in the US. After the divestiture of the telephone giant AT&T and the liberaliza-
tion of the remaining core in US telecommunications, AT&T entered European
markets through joint ventures with Philips and Olivetti. At the same time, IBM
diversified into telecommunications by purchasing stock in MCI. In the eyes
of EC industrial policy makers, this was an alarming development. They feared
that US multinationals, in addition to their hegemony in information technol-
ogy, would also conquer Europe’s communication market. If Europe was to
have any chance of remaining internationally competitive, the Community
would have to act.
Additional impetus for Community action came when the US government
began putting the Europeans under pressure to open their telecom markets as
well. Combined with the threat posed by American firms, this created a situa-
tion in which the Commission was able to wrest new competencies from the
EC member states. Thus, a Special Task Force was created in 1983 within the
DG III (Internal Market) in order to implement the actions that Commissioner
Davignon had in mind. To increase the competitiveness of the European tele-
communications industry, the Commission proposed opening the internal tele-
communications market by means of national liberalization and deregulation
measures.
Concerning the major goal of liberalization, two phases can be distinguished,
each creating a different actor configuration and varying power relations in
telecommunications policy. The first phase extends from the creation of the Task
Force (1983) up to the publication of a Green Paper (1987), during which the
EC still had to struggle for legitimacy. The second phase starts after the Green
Paper, when the EC began to implement the principles expressed in the Green
Paper’s policy guidelines.
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Between 1983 and 1986 the Commission – more precisely the newly created
Special Task Force under the responsibility of Carpentier – achieved its goal of
gaining support and creating awareness for this new sectoral policy domain. The
awareness strategy was basically oriented toward three goals: legitimating EC
action in telecommunications vis à vis the hostile national PTTs, creating a
coalition of supporters for this action by mobilizing those who were positively
affected by community action, and stimulating and coordinating the various
initiatives taken so far within the Commission by DG XIII, DG III and DG IV
(not to mention DG XII) within a single and supposedly more efficient political
context. The Special Task Force launched a series of studies by consulting firms,
mostly American, to show that Europe was losing ground in telecommunica-
tions and that coordinated action was necessary. These studies were presented
in open fora to which major representatives of industries were invited. Growing
awareness helped to formulate "Six Action Lines" for the promotion of a Euro-
pean telecommunications policy.15
The creation of committees which were to lay the foundation of the Commis-
sion’s policy network was essential to this period. The SOGT (Senior Official
Group for Telecommunications) was established by the Council as an advisory
body to the Commission on telecommunications issues in November 1983.
Composed of high-ranking civil servants from the member states, SOGT’s func-
tion was similar to that of the COREPER (Comité des Représentants Perma-
nents). In addition the GAP (Groupe d’ Analyse et de Prévision), also created
in 1983, was to help the Commission forecast the long-term development of
telecommunications networks. But both SOGT and GAP were dominated by
PTTs, due to the balance of power existing at that time.
In addition, the Commission tried to stimulate the awareness of user groups.
Since the national associations of telecommunications users16 were relatively
weak, and/or mainly affiliated with the PTTs, the Commission tried to find
representatives of large users at the international level. Thus the International
Telecommunications Users Group (INTUG) and the Union of Industrial and
Employers Confederations (UNICE) became involved in the process of advising
the Commission on policy issues in telecommunications.
The pace at which the Commission entered into telecommunications policy is
indicated by the short intervals in which recommendations, Council decisions,
15 The official document is referred as Com(83) 573 final. A revised version of the
Action Lines was issued by the Commission to the Council under the reference
Com(84) 277 final.
16 Such as AFFUTT in France or Deutsche Telecom e.V. in Germany.
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directives and regulations were issued as of 1983. Between November 1984 and
January 1989 the Commission passed 17 major decisions (see Cordaro 1990;
Delcourt 1991). In the same period, the number of consulting committees to
the Commission’s DG XIII, responsible for information and communications
technology, increased considerably, from two between 1980 and 1984 to 14 in
1985 (Grote 1990: 242). Last but not least, new divisions in charge of telecommu-
nications, information industry and innovation were officially added to DG XIII
at the beginning of 1987. This significantly increased the institutional weight
of the European telecommunications policy.
The Green Paper on Telecommunications
Parallel to the expansion of EC activities in telecommunications, the 1992 (Inter-
nal Market) process began to unfold – a further supportive element in EC tele-
communications policy. In order to establish guidelines for European telecom-
munications policy in the context of the 1992 program and to forge intraeuro-
pean and transeuropean alliances for deregulation and liberalization, the Com-
mission issued a Green Paper on Telecommunications in Summer 1987. Unlike the
Action Lines, the Green Paper received wide recognition as well as support
from the majority of the parties involved. This has to be seen as a direct conse-
quence of the awareness-building policy of the Commission and certain signifi-
cant changes in the international policy environment. A year after the divesti-
ture of AT&T in 1983, the British government privatized British Telecom and
licensed a competitor, Mercury, who entered the market in 1986. The Japanese
government privatized NTT and opened competition in 1985. The Dutch, the
French and the German governments, partly "assisted" by the Commission,
were preparing reforms at this time. The conditions for success were thus very
different from past initiatives.
The key provisions of the Green Paper aimed at deregulation and increased
competition. But the provision of network infrastructures and basic services
(especially voice) were to remain unchallenged, under the exclusive control of
the national PTTs. Concerning enhanced services and terminal equipment,
however, the Green Paper called for radical liberalization. It also called for the
PTTs to separate their regulatory activities from their operational ones (Ungerer
1989).
After publication in June 1987 the paper was sent to the Council, the European
Parliament and the ECOSOC (Economic and Social Council). In a broad con-
sultation process, the national PTTs, the telecommunications industry, the com-
puter industry, a number of user representatives, some trade unions and other
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organizations representing social interests were invited to give comments. Up
to February 1988 the Commission had received written statements from 49
organizations and associations (corporate actors).
Among the nonpublic operators in Europe, it was British Telecom and Swedish
Televerket who responded to the Green Paper – the public operators had been
consulted via intergovernmental linkages. The manufacturers were represented
by three individual multinational firms, four national peak and sector organi-
zations, but only by two European associations, the peak organization of em-
ployers (UNICE) and the organization of the European Telecommunications
Producers (ECTEL). A further representative body of manufacturers was the
"Big 12" Roundtable of European Industrialists. User interests were expressed
by several large firms and a large number of national, European and interna-
tional user organizations covering all usage and application aspects. In addition,
the national Chambers of Commerce reacted primarily as representatives of
business users. At least three organizations were committed to labor or personnel
interests of the telecommunications operators – but no organization is listed
representing the interests of labor in the manufacturing sector. Other organiza-
tions commenting on the Green Paper were standardization bodies, special
European organizations such as CERN and RARE, the US Government and the
EFTA.
The Commission published the conclusions of the consultation process in the
following months and formulated an implementation plan including a list of
measures and a strict timetable. A subsequent Council resolution (30 June 1988)
strongly supported the Commission’s major policy objectives. The policy lines
then were commented upon by the European Parliament on 14 December 1988.
In the following year several directives were passed in line with the Green
Paper program.
For an analysis of interests clusters and structural features of the policy network
"around" the Green Paper we drew on: (1) an analytical summary of the reac-
tions publicly expressed by the responding actors; (2) a list of items that had
been added by the actors to the Green Book proposals, both prepared and
published by the Commission (Ungerer et al. 1989: 276-302, 463-472); and (3)
copies of the original statements which the actors had submitted to the Com-
mission. Using coding procedures to dichotomize the actors’ positions concern-
ing the different facets of the commission’s proposals (agreement, disagreement,
no comment/ neutral), we developed an "interest matrix", which we then pro-
cessed by means of multidimensional scaling (MDS). This treatment, which
detects affinities and differences of interests, resulted in two major findings.
On the one hand, it is possible to group the actors roughly along an axis which
indicates their overall position towards the Green Paper, and, on the other hand,
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we find a remarkable pluralism of interests concerning the array of measures
proposed by the Commission. We can thus conclude that the policy network
was not one-dimensional in the sense that general support or opposition to-
wards the Green Paper was the only discriminating variable. Had that been
the case, the only function of the actors would have been granting or denying
legitimacy to the Commission’s action. Rather, the analysis provides evidence
that the policy network incorporates diverging interests and views. It is focused
on sectoral policy, but it is not significantly biased towards a specific policy
outcome. Regarding the actors’ overall positions we find three major circles,
with most actors clearly belonging to one of them17:
1. The status-quo oriented opponents, many of them traditional clients of
the PTT complex: two labor organizations, the Federation of PTT Workers
(PTTI), the Federation of Public Utilities, the Consumer Federation
(BEUC), the European Space Agency, British Telecom, the Joint European
Standards Institution (CEN/ CENELEC), the European Service Industry
Forum and a few others;
2. The strong supporters: INTUG, the Information Service Providers (EuAIS),
IBM, the Belgian Telecommunications Users Group and its European sister
ECTUA, the Telecommunications Manufacturers (ECTEL), the European
Engineers Association (EEA) and a few others;
3. A third circle including: the American Chamber of Commerce, the Dutch
Business Telecommunications Users Association, Digital Equipment
(DEC). This group also broadly supports the Green Paper but, in addition,
believes that the traditional voice monopoly is not sustainable, either for
technical or for economic reasons.
The significance of the Green Paper has to be seen in a broader perspective.
Basically, this document owes most of its success to its "marketing" by the
Commission. Much as the "White Paper for the Completion of the European
Market by 1992" has become the reference text of what is called now "Europe
1992", the Green Paper is the cornerstone of the achievement of a European
Telecommunications Policy. In its content, the Green Paper does not differ very
much from the "Six Action Lines" adopted by the Council in 1984. The two
major differences are the Open Network Provision (ONP) concept and the
separation of regulation and operation of telecommunications networks and
services. The latter was implemented by the most influential European countries
at that time (UK, France, Germany). At least in the case of Germany, as we will
show in the next section, liberalization was initiated, discussed and legislated
during the same period of time in which the Green Paper was finalized, with
17 That there are three rather that two circles is a further indicator of the network’s
pluralist structure; within each circle we find a surprising diversity.
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the EC participating in the German segment of the emerging European telecom-
munications policy network. ONP was directly derived from the US Open
Network Architecture (ONA) and adapted to the European context. Unlike
ONA, ONP was not intended to break down the public networks into basic
elements, but instead to provide clear and well-defined interfaces to facilitate
access from users’ and service providers’ equipment.
We assume that the pace and density of measures which led to the shaping
of a new EC action domain could only be realized in a constellation where
telecommunications was still a minor policy matter receiving little attention
from the broader public and from high politics. As the far-ranging implications
of the new policy became clear, the status of telecommunications policy rose
on the agenda – this was the major achievement of the Green Paper. From then
on, the functioning of the policy-making process in telecommunications was
very much along the lines of the "transnational network model" sketched in
Figure 1 above.
In the subsequent period, the EC telecommunications policy almost became
a "victim" of its own success. Shortly after the Council approved the Green
Paper guidelines, the higher significance on the policy agenda created more
intense conflicts between those countries tending to be liberal and those tending
to be protectionist. The distribution of formal competencies between several
General Directorates (DG) of the Commission, the Commission and the Council
and the EC institutions and the member states also became an issue. In 1988
under the guidance of Sutherland, DG IV (Competition) issued a contested
directive on the liberalization of the terminal equipment market. The directive
was formulated outside the new transnational policy network; DG XIII and
other stakeholders had not been consulted. Although this subject was part of
the Green Paper recommendations, and thus approved by the Council, the
directive, for instance, was challenged by an appeal to the European Court of
Justice by the French government, which was subsequently joined by Belgium,
Germany, and Italy (Cordaro 1991: 33). They contested the fact that the Com-
mission had too broadly interpreted Art. 90 § 3 of the Rome Treaty, which
entitles the Commission to take measures in order to ensure that the special
rights granted to certain national companies or administrations by their govern-
ments do not obstruct the full completion of the European Common Market.
According to the plaintiffs, by issuing their own directives (and not a directive
approved by the Council) the Commissioners established a regulatory power
far exceeding their normal supervisory competencies and thus undermining
the position of the Council in the definition of a European telecommunications
policy. The decision of the European Court of Justice, issued in March 1991,
generally strengthened the position of the Commission vis à vis the member
states and the Council and formally broadened the corridor in which the Com-
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mission can bypass other relevant actors in telecommunications. It is evident
that the Commission has acquired a much stronger position in European tele-
communications than it had a decade ago, including the principal right to issue
directives with far-reaching consequences.
When developing its more general strategic plans, the Commission continues
to rely on the transnational policy network within which the specific goals are
formulated and adjusted to a broad common denominator of a moderate,
Europe-wide liberalization. Examples are the conflicts which unfolded during
the formulation process of the ONP and the service directives, which were now
Council directives: The member states could not compromise on the definition
of value-added services to be completely opened up to free competition. While
the northern European member states, led by the UK and Germany, were advo-
cating full liberalization of data networks, the southern European countries
(including France and Belgium) were still in favor of monopoly. Compromises
could only be reached after long and painstaking negotiations in December
1989.
In Section 2 we emphasized that the EC’s position is often similar to that of
national governments regarding difficulties in policy implementation. To ensure
effective policy implementation, it has to organize cooperation and support by
incorporating the most relevant social and political interests in the European
and national policy arenas. Since the success of EC telecommunications policy
integration finally relies on the harmonized adoption of the directive by the
member states, the Commission often backs this synchronization of EC direc-
tives and national legislation by transnational alliance building – a form of
diagonal interaction which is inconceivable within two-level game models. In
this case the Commission intervenes directly in national policy arenas and forms
alliances with national policy actors to exert pressure on national governments
and legislators. The parallel formulation of the EC Green Paper and the legisla-
tion of the German telecommunications reform is a good example of such diag-
onal interaction linkages.
4 The EC Commission in a National Policy Arena: The German
Telecommunications Reform
The Commission of the EC was not only involved in the executive tasks of
formulating proposals and collecting and aggregating national opinions toward
a common European telecommunications policy, but participated directly in
the national German policy process as well. We mentioned above that, parallel
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to the formulation process of the Green Paper, Germany passed a telecommuni-
cations reform law.18 In 1986 the German government established an expert
group made up of representatives from the most relevant sociopolitical groups
(the so-called "Witte Commission"). This commission was charged with develop-
ing reform proposals, and only a few months after the publication of the Green
Paper, it recommended a "Restructuring of German Telecommunications" quite
similar to the Green Paper guidelines (cf. Witte 1988). The major proposals
aimed at the organizational separation of telecommunications from the other
branches of the PTT, the separation of regulatory functions from operational
tasks, and some significant liberalization in the service and equipment domain.
The new TELEKOM was to keep its network (transmission) monopoly and its
monopoly on telephone service, but all other services would be offered in com-
petition with other providers. The market for terminal equipment would be
completely liberalized. One of the experts reporting to the Witte Commission
was Herbert Ungerer from DG XIII of the CEC (see Witte 1988: Annex 1).
The draft of the reform act was largely based on the Witte Commission’s pro-
posals. In September 1988 the draft was presented to the Parliament, which
referred it to its committee on post and telecommunications, which organized
two hearings. The first hearing was related to the Green Paper and took place
in February 1988, a few months before the "Witte report" was published and
the reform act was drafted. At this time, too, Herbert Ungerer participated as
the representative of the CEC. This hearing was labelled by many participants
as an anticipatory hearing on the eve of the German reform. Ungerer was also
present at the second hearing in November 1988 dealing exclusively with the
German reform act. Both hearings were attended by more than fifty individuals
or organizational representatives.
After the enactment of the reform law in mid-1989, we carried out a survey
among the most relevant policy actors in order to find out the structures of
influence reputation and communication19. While the general results of this
analysis have been published elsewhere (Schneider/ Werle 1991), we will use
these data here to identify network linkages between the national policy arena
in Germany and the European Community context.
It is interesting to note that 22 of the 38 organizations in the telecommunications
policy network which responded to the questionnaire reported intensive infor-
18 For a more detailed account of this process see Werle (1990).
19 We excluded scientists and other experts not directly affected by the reform, but
interviewed, in addition to the other participants in the hearings, political parties
and the relevant ministries in this action domain (N=38).
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mation exchange with the European Community during the formulation of the
German reform law. All 22 were national organizations; only 2 of them had
a governmental status, the other 20 organizations being parties (4), national
interest groups (9) and firms (7). On the basis of these network data we com-
puted indices about the structural positions of the CEC in the formulation of
the German reform law and found that the CEC had a rather prominent posi-
tion: It was well integrated in the political communication process, and its
influence in the reform process was rated well above the average by the other
actors in the network (influence reputation).20
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Figure 2: Interest Similarity and Influence Reputation
20 The value of 0.56 was lower than the maximum influence of 0.87 but higher than
the mean of 0.42. In Figure 2 we set the highest empirical value on the theoretical
maximum of 1.0. The Commission then displays a relative influence reputation
of 0.64.
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Figure 2 shows the Commission’s position with respect to influence reputation
and policy concertation.21 It combines the actors’ relative influence reputation
(designated by circles with different perimeters) with a measure of similarity
of reform interests (designated by the location of actors in a two-dimensional
space). The degree of similarity was computed using multidimensional scaling
(MDS), which indicated that the most relevant dimension was being in favor
of or opposed to liberal reorganization of telecommunications (Schneider/
Werle 1991: 125-130). According to this dimension (horizontal axis in Figure 2),
the positions of relevant German ministries (Ministry of the Interior = BMI,
Ministry of Economics = BMWi and, of course, the PTT ministry = BMP), of
the larger of the two governing political parties (CDU/ CSU), and of manufac-
turers of telecommunications equipment (especially Siemens and Bosch) were
very similar to that of the Commission (CEC).22 This alliance-building and
interaction in the transnational policy network thus produced a considerable
degree of policy concertation among the most relevant German actors and the
key actors of the European Community.
5 Conclusion
The description of the policy formation and implementation processes at the
European level has demonstrated the important role of transnational policy
networks. They are frameworks for concertation and synchronization of European and
national policy processes. From the network perspective, the Commission of the
EC cannot be seen as a mere executive agent of the member states, but must
be viewed rather as an actively participating corporate actor promoting its own
institutional self-interests. In this role the CEC is neither just another actor
21 In order to keep the graphical presentation simple and comprehensible we omit-
ted actors with small influence reputation scores. They were included, however,
in the multidimensional scaling procedure and in the computation of relative
influence reputation.
22 Actors further left on the axis like the Social Democrats (SPD), the Green Party
(Grüne) or the Postal Workers’ Unions (DPG, DPV) were in strong opposition
to the liberal reorganization of telecommunications, whereas actors further right
like the Association of German Machinery Manufacturers (VDMA), the Associa-
tion of (large) Telecommunications Users (DTeV), the liberal Free Democratic
Party (FDP) or the Federation of German Industry (BDI) strongly demanded
more liberalization. The fact that there is variation on the vertical as well as on
the horizontal axis (even if the former is not as great) indicates that other interest
dimensions were relevant, too. For our argument, however, they can be ne-
glected.
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among nation states and transnational groups, nor an "impartial" moderator
or agent aggregating member states’ interests. The Commission and the other
EC institutions have autonomous action capacities, and they are "biased" to-
wards policies that strengthen the EC as a whole. The inherent checks and
balances prevailing in the pluralist European policy network in telecommunica-
tions safeguard against the domination of a single actor. The position of the
European Commission, however, is more than that of a primus inter pares. This
has been widely ignored by many prominent studies of EC policy making
concentrating too much on the Council, which is ex ante considered the most
significant European institution. But formal treaties or constitutions do not
always provide a complete picture.
Concertation and synchronization of European and national policy making in
transnational policy networks has been an explicit goal of the Commission.
These networks have emerged as a means of coping with increasing interdepen-
dency and power dispersion in contemporary national and international politics.
Just as many nation states are no longer more than semisovereign with regard
to their own society (Katzenstein 1987), the European Community has even less
power over its member states. Since the dispersion of power resources renders
hierarchical governance infeasible, policy networks have emerged as attractive
modes of concertation for the actors. Telecommunications offers an impressive
example of this development.
However, the prevailing type of European policy network can also be prob-
lematical. A first point not explicitly addressed in this paper is the question
of inclusiveness or comprehensiveness of the networks. Although the networks
often seem to attract relevant and powerful actors, not every actor succeeds
in gaining access. European policy networks are selective and tend to erect
"entry barriers". Interests not represented by resourceful and powerful corporate
actors tend to be completely excluded: in the case of telecommunications, for
instance, smaller equipment manufacturers and installers, often "clients" of their
national telecommunications administrations, have had little influence in the
debate on deregulation. They, and the trade unions to a certain degree as well,
could only articulate their position after the Green Paper had already been
drafted. Conversely, these actors were influential enough at that time to block
any drastic reform of the PTTs at the national level in France and in Germany.
Special and parochial interests which cannot be aggregated in a European di-
mension are also inclined to be neglected or bypassed: the space and satellite
segments of the telecommunications market are a case in point. Since business
interests are usually better organized and better informed on the European or
transnational level, it seems quite plausible that this will create further struc-
tural asymmetries in the organization of social interests groups (Kohler-Koch
1991: 63). European policy networks also reinforce a tendency of sectoralization
Dang-Nguyen, Schneider and Werle: Corporate Actor Networks 29
of policy domains, which makes cross-sectoral "horizontal" coordination more
difficult to achieve (Peters 1992: 80-81; Kohler-Koch 1992: 102-105).
A second point is that European policy networks aggravate the difficulties
already encountered by classical forms of democratic control at the national
level.23 Bureaucracy in general gains influence at the expense of both the
European and the national parliaments. EC legislation normally develops within
the framework of closed-door negotiations; power is increasingly concentrated
in the hands of small bureaucratic groups representing key ministries, often
successfully insulated from parliamentary control and public scrutiny. Control
over EC policy processes may even be used by national governments to widen
their existing advantages over parliamentary control, when negotiators in Brus-
sels advance their particular (national) interest positions on the one hand and
cite the need for harmonization to quell dissenting opinion at home on the other
(Brickman et al. 1985: 67). Warnings about such negative effects of transnational
politics were formulated rather early (e.g. Kaiser 1972). With respect to Euro-
pean telecommunications, similar reproaches were made by Fangmann (1990),
who frankly questioned the democratic legitimation of the EC in this sector.
Finally, we must assess the ability of the European Commission to influence
the reform of the national telecommunications sectors’ operation and to break
up the traditional postal-industrial complexes in most of the European coun-
tries. The Commission succeeded in transforming this primarily national issue
into a European one, pushing the member states towards the harmonization
of their policies and, moreover, setting the pace for a constant and convergent
development of their legislation in the direction defined by the Commission
itself. Thus, in less than a decade the telecommunications operators lost their
status as public administrations belonging to the sovereign core of nation states.
To achieve such results, the European Commission had to succeed in mobilizing
a network of supporters at the European and the national levels (large users,
information technology firms eager to enter the telecommunications area, stan-
dardization bodies, "friendly" governments) as well as neutralizing the tradi-
tional telecommunications complex.
External developments and pressures such as the US deregulation and the
Japanese challenge were "helpful" for the establishment of a European policy
domain, which was by no means a result of "functional necessity" or of an
institutionally fixed logical "next step" towards European integration, though
this (misleading) interpretation may appear tempting when we consider that
23 For perspectives on the EC which differ from – but partly complement – our
own, see Lepsius (1992) and Scharpf (1993).
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the implementation of the Green Paper’s recommendations has completely
escaped the control of the national telecommunications administrations and
has now become an almost exclusive domain of the European Commission.
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